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Abstract
This paper challenges the view of Eggertsson (2010a) who argued that some scal policy
measures like an increase in government spending or sales tax cut can be very e¤ective in
the recent peculiar environment of zero Federal Funds rate in the US. In particular, we show
that the size of multipliers depends on the type of factor market structure (economy-wide or
specic) we assume. Regarding the robustness of the results of Eggertsson (2010a) we argue that
multipliers under zero nominal interest rate are a magnitude higher than those with positive
interest only if the scal stimulus is su¢ ciently long (around ten years under specic labor
market). Our work conrms and extends the results of Christiano (2010) who questioned the
quantitative nature of the wage tax multiplier of Eggertsson (2010a).
JEL classication: E52, E62
Keywords: scal policy, multipliers, homogenous factor market, heterogenous factor market,
zero nominal interest
1 Introduction
After the introduction of the American Recovery and Reinvestment Act of 2009 there has been
a renewed interest on the e¤ectiveness of scal policy in the recent environment of virtually zero
Federal Funds Rate. The debate in the literature on the value of scal multipliers1 was sparked by
the report of Romer and Bernstein (2009) who provided very optimistic estimates on the impact of
the American Recovery and Reinvestment Act of 2009.
Several academic papers appeared in the last two years discussing the magnitude of scal mul-
tipliers (see, e.g., Christiano et al., 2010; Eggertsson, 2010a; Uhlig, 2010; Woodford, 2010; Cogan
Cardi¤ Business School, Cardi¤ University, Colum Drive, Cardi¤, CF10 3EU, UK.
Email: kaszabl@cardi¤.ac.uk
1This is the change in output due to a change in government spending, dYt+k=dGt: For k = 0 we get back the
impact multiplier.
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et al. 2009; Hall, 2009). Most of these papers employ Neo Classical or New Keynesian type of
models to investigate under what conditions the scal multiplier is large. It turns out that under
positive nominal interest rate the multipliers in a New Keynesian model di¤er mainly due to the
type of preferences used2 , the assumption on the conduct of monetary policy3 and whether the
nominal interest rate is positive or zero. This paper argues that the large multipliers of Christiano
et al. (2010), Eggertsson (2010a) and Woodford (2010) in case of zero nominal interest rate are not
necessarily large if we change some trivial features of the underlying model like the assumed factor
market or the length of scal spending.
Surprisingly, none of the above papers discussed the role of assumptions on factor market
homogenous (economy-wide) or heterogenous (specic/industry-specic)45 on the size of scal
multipliers. Using the basic New Keynesian model of Eggertsson (2010a) augmented for positive
steady-state government spending (instead of his assumption of zero) and decreasing returns (in-
stead of his assumption of constant-returns) we show that scal multipliers derived under economy-
wide labor market are higher than the ones under specic labor market.
Even more importantly, we show that the size of multipliers in Eggertsson (2010a) are extremely
sensitive to the duration of the shock that makes the zero bound binding. In particular, under
specic factor market and zero nominal interest the shock has to last for at least ten years6 with
a sustained increase in spending during this period in order for the multiplier to spectacularly
exceed the same multipliers derived under positive nominal interest rate with a Taylor rule in
action. The two conditions that must be satised in order to have a meaningful gap between
the size of multipliers under economy-wide and specic labor markets are the assumption of zero
nominal interest and a su¢ ciently long deationary shock that makes zero bound on nominal interest
binding.
Also importantly, using the same simple New Keynesian model with only price staggering and
specic factors, we conrm the result of Christiano (2010) who, employing a New Keynesian model
with both price and wage staggering, presented in a deterministic experiment that the labor tax
2 It matters whether we use separable or non-separable preferences as the latter implies complementarity between
consumption and hours worked, a reduced (negative) wealth e¤ect on consumption and, hence, a large multiplier.
3 In a frictionless New Keynesian model with homogenous factor market, Calvo pricing and separable preferences
Woodford (2010) shows that the value of the multiplier is one when monetary policy maintains a constant real interest
rate implying through the intertemporal Euler equation a constant consumption path. Instead, when monetary
policy follows a Taylor rule the multiplier is slightly under one.
4Factor market means labor market in this paper. However, instead of assuming rm-specic labor market we
can arrive at similar results under the alternative assumption of rm-specic (xed) capital market as well. That
is, our results are robust to slightly di¤erent settings too. Woodford (2003) shows that specic labor market and
rm-specic capital market leads to rather similar outcomes. These assumptions about factor markets are discussed
below in detail.
5Specic factor market means that there is no instantenous factor price equalisation among rms after reallocation
of capital or labor reecting the fact that sectoral movements of inputs across rms is costly and takes time. Thus,
it means that capital and labor may be priced di¤erently across rms.
6Eggertsson (2010a) estimated his model using ination and output data from the troughof the Great Depression
(i.e. one observation for ination and another for output) by Bayesian methods and obtained mode of a 10 years
shock.
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hike multiplier of Eggertsson (2010a) is quantitatively negligible7 . In addition, we extend the
discussion of Christiano (2010) and show in our model8 that the government spending and sales tax
cut multipliers under nominal interest rate is similar in magnitude to those under positive interest
contrary to the ndings of Eggertsson (2010a).
It is also shown in this paper that the extension of the model of Eggertsson (2010a) for non-
zero government spending (instead of his assumption of zero) and decreasing returns (instead of
constant returns) implies a signicant drop in the value of spending multiplier. In particular, using
the calibration of Eggertsson (2010a) we show that a generalisation of his model for positive long-
run government spending and decreasing returns in technology reduces the (absolute) size of the
government spending and wage tax cut multipliers non-trivially. In particular, the former drops to
1.63 from 2.28 while the latter rises to -0.4 from -1.02.
In a related paper, Christiano et al. (2010) obtain large multipliers in a similar model under
zero nominal interest rate with non-separable preferences, assuming homogenous factor market and
a di¤erent calibration. In the simple model in section two and three of their paper they present a
spending multiplier for zero interest rate that is obtained for empirically implausible value of Calvo
parameter (0.85 implying that rms hold their price xed, on average, for longer than a year).
However, we show that in case of specic factor market instead of the homogenous one multipliers
are large even for plausible lengths of price inertia.
Factor market assumption matters a lot. To highlight this fact, we make a comment onWoodford
(2010) who derives large multipliers in a model similar to Eggertsson (2010a) with homogenous9
factor markets using parameter values from Eggertsson (2010a) who have estimated his model
parameters under the assumption of heterogenous labor market. The problem is that using the
calibration of Eggertsson (2010a) in a model with homogenous labor market does not result in
determinacy when nominal interest is zero. Thus, Woodford (2010) could not arrive at the results
with his formulas unless he used the ones of Eggertsson (2010a).
The paper is organised as follows. In section 2 we describe the setup of the model. In section 3
we provide the log-linear optimality conditions of the model. Section 4 characterises how we solve
for equilibrium as a function of scal policy under positive and zero nominal interest rate. Section
5 contains calibration. Section 6 presents results. Finally, section 7 concludes.
7The landmark contribution of Eggertsson (2010a) is the presentation of the seemingly counterintuitive negative
labor tax cut multiplier in a baseline New Keynesian setting. Then, Christiano (2010) asked what is the relevance
of the labor tax hike multiplier i.e. how big it is.
8Our paper similar to Eggertsson (2010a) and unlike Christiano (2010) considers a stochastic experiment.
9 In particular, using a concave production function, Woodford (2010) assumed instantenous factor prize equalisa-
tion in both capital and labor markets. This implies an outcome that coincides with the one under under homogenous
labor market.
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Table 1: Extensions in this paper
Separable prefs. Non-separable prefs.
Eggertsson (2010) This paper Christiano et al. (2010) This paper
Factor market Heterogenous Homog./Heterog. Homog. Homog./Heterog.
Spending/GDP ( GY ) zero positive positive positive
Technology CRS CRS/DRS CRS CRS/DRS
Mark-up () no e¤ect no e¤ect 1§ 1.085$
Remarks to Table 1: CRS=constant returns; DRS=decreasing returns; GY =steady-state government
spending-GDP ratio. {: The non-separable preferences setup with DRS is not discussed below because
of the lack of analytical solution in that case. However, it is discussed in detail in the Technical Appendix.
§: The steady-state mark-up is eliminated by means of an employment subsidy. $: this value is based
on the estimated demand elasticity ( = 12:78) by Eggertsson (2010a) in Table (2).
2 The setup of the model
Before we show the elements of the model used in this paper we summarise our extensions in Table
(1). The description of the model with separable preferences follows Eggertsson (2010a) who uses
a standard RBC model enriched with monopolistic competition and staggered price setting. The
setup of the model with non-separable preferences of the form in Christiano et al. (2010) whose
loglinear equilibrium conditions is shortly presented below is left to the Technical Appendix.
Households. There is a continuum of households of measure one. The representative household
maximise
Et
1X
T=t
T tT

u(CT ) + f(GT ) 
Z 1
0
v(lT (j))dj

;
where  is the discount factor, T is a preference shock and CT is a Dixit-Stiglitz aggregate of
continuum of di¤erentiated goods, Ct 
hR 1
0
fct(i)g  1 di
i 
 1
with the elasticity of substitution
 > 1. There is a corresponding price index, Pt 
hR 1
0
fpt(i)g1 di
i 1
1 
. When labor is homogenous,
there is a single, economy-wide nominal wage, Wt. However, in case of heterogenous labor market
each household provides a specic type of labor j which is used in industry i and renumerated
with a specic nominal wage, Wt(j). The standard assumptions apply for preferences: u0, f 0 > 0,
u00, f 00 < 0, v0 > 0 and v00 < 0 and G is perfectly substitutable for private consumption. The
representative household budget constraint is:
(1 + St )PtCt +Bt = (1  At 1)(1 + it 1)Bt 1 +
Z 1
0
Zt(i)di+ (1  Wt )
Z 1
0
Wt(j)lt(j)dj   Tt;
where Zt is the prot distributed lump-sum to households. There are three types of taxes in the
model: a tax on nancial assets, At , tax on sales, 
S
t , and a tax on labor, 
W
t . Thus, represen-
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tative household maximise utility taking wages and prices as given with respect to the budget
constraint choosing ct(i), lt(j), Bt for all j and i at all time t. The utility-maximisation problem
yields the intratemporal and intertemporal Euler equations together with a transversality condition
for bonds to eliminate Ponzi schemes:
Wt(j)
Pt
=
vl(lt(j))
uC(Ct)
1 + St
1  Wt
;
Et

uC(Yt+1  Gt+1)
uC(Yt  Gt) (1  
A
t+1)Rt+1

=  1Et

t
t+1
(1 + St+1)
(1 + St )
Pt+1
Pt

;
and
lim
T!1
Et

BT
PT (1 + ST )

uC(CT ) = 0:
Firms. There is a perfectly competitive rm that bundles intermediary goods, yt(i) into a single
nal good. The cost-minimisation problem of the perfectly competitive rm yields the demand curve
for intermediate good i of the form: yt(i) = [p(i)=Pt] Yt. There is a continuum of intermediate
goods producer rms in measure one that hires specic10 type of labor j from each household.
Intermediary rm i that operates in industry j with a total cost function, TCt(j) maximises its
prot, Zt(i) = pt(i)yt(i)   TCt(j), taking the demand curve of good i as given. Following Edge
(2002) and Woodford (2003) we assume specic-labor market i.e. household j can sell its labor to
rm i only, and, thus, i = j. Under the assumption of staggered price-setting ala Calvo (1983)
the prot-maximisation problem of the intermediary is:
max
pt
1X
T=t
()
T t
Qt;T
"
pt

pt
PT
 
YT   TC
 
pt
PT
 
YT
!#
;
where Qt;T  UC(CT )UC(Ct) PtPT is the discount factor and we substituted for yt(i) the demand curve
of intermediary good i given above. Eggertsson (2010a) assumes constant-returns-to-scale (CRS)
technology. However, we derive multipliers under decreasing-returns-to-scale (DRS) as well using
yt(i) = [lt(j)]
1=,  > 111 . When  = 1 we are back to CRS. The rst-order condition (FOC)
associated with this problem is:
1X
T=t
()
T t
T

pt
PT
  1
YT

pt
PT
  
   1mct;T (i)

= 0;
10Or, it hires homogenous labor and index j can be dropped.
11Below we discuss how sensitive our results are to the fact whether we use specic labor or specic capital market.
In case of specic capital market we use a constant-returns Cobb-Douglas formulation: Yt(i) = K1 aN(i)a where
K expresses the fact that capital stocks are rm-specic and not variable input (i.e. K is a constant). In the latter
case the Cobb-Douglas formulation is practically a decreasing-returns production function in variable input Nt(i).
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where p

t
PT
is the optimal relative price,  1 is the markup due to monopolistic competition and
mct;T (i) is the time-T real marginal cost of rm i which last set its price at time t. Note that
assuming DRS instead of CRS implies that the marginal cost of an individual rm becomes depen-
dent on its own production (for both types of factor markets) and also a¤ecting the slope of the
New Keynesian Phillips Curve (NKPC).
The aggregate price index is composed of a fraction (1 ) of rmswho set their prices optimally
at pt and the remaining fraction () of those who keep them xed at Pt 1:
Pt =
h
(1  ) (pt )1  + P 1 t 1
i 1
1 
.
The model is closed with the aggregate resource constraint, Yt = Ct +Gt, and a restriction for
the nominal interest rate: it  0. The monetary policy is conducted through a Taylor rule:
it = max

0; f

Pt
Pt 1
; Yt; t

,
where f is a function that is specied in detail below. Fiscal policy is a sequence of variables,
fGt; Wt ; St ; At g, specied below.
3 The log-linear equilibrium conditions
We loglinearise the model around its non-stochastic zero ination steady-state. The New-Keynesian
IS curve which is the loglinear Euler equation together with the loglinear aggregate resource
constraint, Y^t = (1  g)C^t + G^t, yields what we can call Aggregate Demand (AD) curve
 [Y^t   EtY^t+1] = ( + 1)[G^t   EtG^t+1] (it   #Ett+1   ret ) + S
h
^St+1   ^St
i
+ A^At (1)
where for separable preferences coe¢ cients are:  =   ,  = 0 and # =   = 1. Further,
    uc
ucc C
,   (1 g), S  1
1+S
, A  1 
1 A and g  1  C= Y = G= Y > 0 are the intertemporal
elasticity of subsitution (),  re-scaled by the level of government spending (), constants scaling
the sales and capital taxes (S and A) and the denition of the steady-state government spending
( G)-GDP ( Y ) ratio, respectively. Variables with a hat are dened as: Y^t  log(Yt= Y ), C^t 
log(Ct= C), G^t  (Gt   G)= Y , ^ it   it    i, i 2 fA;S;Wg and ret  log  1 + Et(^t   ^t+1) where
^t  log(t=).12
12Note that, here, in the loglinearised model it refers to log(1 + it) and not dened as log deviation from steady-
state. Further, ^At is dened such that a one percent increase in capital income per year is comparable with the tax
on labor income.
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The New Keynesian Phillips curve (or Aggregate Supply AS curve) is given by:
t = Y^t +  (
W ^Wt + 
S ^St   #G^t) + Ett+1 (2)
with
  (1  )(1  )

! + #+ (  1)
1 + Ihet!y + Ihom (  1) ;  
1
! + #+ (  1) ;
!y  (1 + !)  1; !  vll
l
vl
; #   1; W  1
1  W ;
where Ihom (Ihet) is an indicator variable which takes on the value of one when we assume homoge-
nous (heterogenous) labor market. For  = 1, g = 0, Ihom = 0 and Ihet = 1 we are back to the
setup of Eggertsson (2010a). Note that only the content of parameters ,  and  change when
we generalise Eggertsson (2010a) for positive long run government spending, DRS and two types
of labor markets.
For non-separable preferences of the kind in Christiano et al. (2010)13 the AD curve has
parameters di¤erent from the separable case14 :    [(1   b) + 1],   (   1),   (1   g),
%   1,   ,  = 1, b  1 W
1+S
.15 Here, besides loglinear Euler and loglinear market clearing
equations we also made use of loglinear production function, Y^t = (1=)N^t, to derive the AD
equation.
The NKPC in case of non-separable preferences can be written with small change, i.e. only the
content of some parameters change (these are denoted with a tilde):
~  (1  )(1  )

~! + ~#+ (  1)
1 + Ihet ~!y + Ihom (  1) ;
~  1
~! + ~#+ (  1) ;
~!y  (1 + ~!)  1; ~! 
N
1  N ;
~#  (1  g) 1.
Our setup investigates  = 1, g > 0, Ihom = 0 and Ihet = 1. However, for  = 1, g > 0, Ihom = 1
and Ihet = 0 we are back to the setup of Christiano et al. (2010). Below we argue that the choice
13Here and for the rest of the paper we refer to the frictionless model in their Section 2 and 3 of Christiano et al.
(2010) and not their model with capital in Section 3 or the medium-sized DSGE model in Section 4.
14Observe that we use the non-separable preferences employed by Christiano et al. (2010), u(Ct; Nt) =
[Ct (1 Nt)1  ]
1  1
1  . Note that for non-separable preferences the intertemporal elasticity of substitution ((1 ) 1)
is di¤erent from the separable case (). Thus, the denition of  in the separable case does no coincide with the 
in the non-separable case.
15The parameters here are derived under the assumption of CRS. Note that they are di¤erent under DRS. The only
caveat under DRS is that steady-state hours that is needed for derivation of the multipliers cannot be calculated
analytically (i.e. we cannot simply substitute for
N
1  N the steady-state of the intratemporal condition). However,
N
1  N can be calculated numerically using e.g. Matlab fsolve algorithm. The AD curve for non-separable preferences
in case of DRS is shown in the Technical Appendix.
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of making either Ihom or Ihet equal to one matters a lot. The monetary policy respects the Taylor
rule:
it = maxf0; ret + t + Y Y^tg; (3)
where coe¢ cients must satisfy:  > 1 and y > 0 (for the restrictions on  and Y see Woodford
(2003)).
The equilibrium can be characterised as collection of stochastic sequences ft; Y^t; it; ret g that
satisfy equilibrium conditions (1)-(3) given path for policy variables fG^t; ^Wt ; ^St ; ^At g which are
nanced by lump-sum taxes either in period t or in future periods, t+ j.
4 Brief description of equilibrium for positive and zero nom-
inal interest rates
Even if this is an innite horizon problem Eggertsson (2010a) shows that it is enough to analyse
a short-run and a long-run equilibrium. Initially we are in steady-state (t = 0). Then from time
t = 1, for some interval, 0 < t < T , which we can call short run, a shock hits the economy. That
is, when t < T the shock is described by an exogenous decrease in ret = r
e
S < 0 with T denoting
the stochastic date at which the shock vanishes. Christiano et al. (2010) interprets this shock as a
rise in peoples propensity towards savings16 . Short-run allocations are denoted with subscript S.
Further, we assume that in period t the shock persists with probability  or dies out with 1  for
all t < T . In the short-run zero lower bound on nominal interest is binding (it = iS = 0) or not
binding (it = iS > 0). In the non-binding case the nominal interest is governed by the Taylor rule.
For time, t  T , variables take on their long-run steady-state values.
Positive Interest rate. When nominal interest rate is positive the system can be solved by the
method of undetermined coe¢ cients. That is, we assume that ination and output is a linear
function of the scal variable, F^S = fG^S ; ^WS ; ^SS ; ^AS g:
S = AF^S ; (4)
Y^S = AY F^S : (5)
We have an exogenous AR(1) process for government spending (and the same could be written for
labour, sales and capital tax as well):
Ft+1 = F

t exp("t+1) (6)
16 In the explanation of Eggertsson (2010a), an exogenous decrease in ret can be translated into an increase in the
probability of default of borrowers creating a spread between risk-free rate and the rate paid on risky loans.
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where  measures persistence of government spending process and " is an i:i:d: shock with zero
mean and constant variance. That is, for expectational variables we have EtF^t+1 = F^S . We
assume that the government spending, the labour tax cut, the sales tax cut and the employment
subsidy to restore e¢ ciency in steady-state is nanced through lump-sum taxes. That is, the
Ricardian equivalence holds under our assumptions and the exact timing of taxes is irrelevant and
we dont have to take into consideration the government budget constraint.
We compute scal multipliers separately. That is, e.g. a sales tax cut implies no change in
other scal instruments (i.e. there is no change in labor, capital tax and government spending).
Furthermore, we assume that changes in spending (or taxes) are o¤set by present or future lump-
sum taxes/transfers, i.e. Ricardian evidence holds17 .
Zero nominal interest rate. In period t and t+1 variable X^i = fF^i; Y^i; ig with F^i = fG^i; ^Wi ; ^Si ; ^Ai g
for i 2 ft; t+ 1g are taking, respectively, the following values:
X^t =
(
X^t = X^S ; 0 < t < T , zero bound binding,
X^t = 0; t  T , zero bound not binding,
and
X^t+1 =
(
(1  )X^S = 0; with probability 1   variable X^t+1 reverts back to steady-state,
X^S ; with probability  zero bound continues to bind.
Next we formulate two conditions under which the zero bound binds. Condition C1 ensures that
the shock in rS is large enough to make the zero bound bind and imposes a constraint on the
magnitude of scal action18 :
ret >
( + 1)(1  )[ + (1  )Y ] +  [(   %)Y   #(    +Y )]
(   %) + [  + 2    ](1  )
G^t
+
 W [(     2)  (   %)Y ]
(   %) + [  + 2    ](1  )
^Wt
  S [(    +2) + (   %)Y ]  S(1  )[ + (1  )Y ]
(   %) + [  + 2    ](1  )
^St
+
A[(1  )Y + ]   A[    +2]
(   %) + [  + 2    ](1  )
^At
17 In a simple RBC model with capital, constant Frisch elasticity preferences and a scal rule that connects changes
in spending to changes in income tax Uhlig (2010) shows that output turn to negative after around two years of the
rise in spending.
18This condition can be derived by substituting equations (8) and (9) into the Taylor rule, equation (3).
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while condition C2 makes sure that the crises do not last for too long19 :
 (1  )(1  ) % > 0: (7)
Thus, in the short run when iS > 0 and C1 does not hold the equilibrium S , Y^S and iS are
described, respectively, by (this is the generalised version of Proposition 3 in Eggertsson (2010a)):20
S = AG^S + B^SS + C^WS +D^AS ; A;B; C;D >0 (constants), (8)
Y^S =
 [   %] + ( + 1)(1  )(1  )
(1  )(  + 2    ) + [   %]
G^S
   
S(   %) + S(  1)(1  )
(  + 2)(1  )   (1  ) + (   %)
^SS (9)
   
W(   %)
(1  )(    +2) + (   %)
^WS
+
A(1  )
(  + 2)(1  )   (1  ) + (   %)
^AS
and
iS = i
e
S + S + Y Y^S :
Similarly, in the short run when i = 0, C1 and C2 hold, the equilibrium is as follows:13
S = AG^S + B^SS + C^WS + D^AS + EreS ; A; B; C; D; E >0 (constants),
Y^S =
( + 1)(1  )(1  ) % #
 (1  )(1  ) % G^S +
% W
 (1  )(1  ) % ^
W
S
+
% S   #S(1  )(1  )
 (1  )(1  ) % ^
S
S +
#A(1  )
 (1  )(1  ) % ^
A
S (10)
+
(1  )
 (1  )(1  ) %r
e
S
and
iS = 0:
Note that the above expressions for Y^S contain the scal multipliers (the constants multiplying
19Condition C2 also makes sure i) to avoid deationary black hole analysed in Eggertsson (2010a) that would
arise at  that satises L() = 0 and ii) ensures that the coe¢ cient on ret in equation (10) is positive so that r
e
t < 0
remains to be satised.
20Constants A;B; C;D ( A; B; C; D; E) are available in the Technical Appendix.
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G^S ; ^
W
S ; ^
S
S and ^
A
S ) for i > 0 and i = 0 cases. In line with Eggertsson (2010a) we assume that  = .
An approximate equilibrium that is correct up to the rst order is a collection of stochastic processes
for fY^t; t; it; ret g that solves equations (1)-(3) given paths for scal policy, fG^t; ^Wt ; ^St ,^At g.
5 Calibration
5.1 Separable preferences
We use the estimated parameters of Eggertsson (2010a) who calibrated his model to data prevailing
under the Great Depression. The values are summasrised in Table (2):
Table 2: Parametrisation of the model with separable preferences
  !   Y 1=  g 
S A W
0.9970 0.86 1.5692 0.9030 1.5 0.5/4 2/3 12.7721 0.2 0.05 0 0.2
 
0.7747 0.9030
Remarks to Table 2: g is from Christiano et al. (2010).  is taken from Woodford (2003).
For this value multipliers are not dened for economy-wide labor market when i = 0.
Hence, we use a lower value,  = :8, that is employed by Christiano et al. (2010).
5.2 Non-separable preferences
We adopt the calibration in section 2 of Christiano et al. (2010) and reproduce them in Table (3).
For parameters not found there we use the estimated (and for the steady-state tax rates calibrated)
values of Eggertsson (2010a).
Table 3: Parametrisation of the model with non-separable preferences
    R  Y 1= g 
S A W
0.9970 2 0.29 0.8 0 1.5 0 2/3 0.2 0.05 0 0.2
  
12.7721 0.85 0.8
Remarks to Table 3: 1= is taken from Woodford (2003).
Values for , S , A and W are borrowed from Eggertsson (2010a).
11
6 Discussion of Results
6.1 The role of labor market structure
Proposition 1 Fiscal multipliers in case of specic factor market are (in absolute value) lower
than those under economy-wide factor market when nominal interest is zero.
The proof is in the Appendix we provide only intuition here. Factor market assumption inu-
ences the model through  which is the multiplier on marginal cost in NKPC (see equations (2)
above). When factor markets are homogenous ( > 1), monopolisitically competitive rms pricing
decisions are strategic substitutes i.e. an individual rm which experiences a rise in the prices of
goods of the other rms will decrease the price of its own good. Whereas the specic factor markets
assumption ( < 1) implies complementarity in pricing decisions among rms21 . To illustrate the
degree of strategic complementary (or strategic substitutability) we compiled Table (added soon!!!!)
which shows how our key parameter, , changes along the di¤erent factor market assumptions. The
lower is the higher is strategic complementarity in pricing. Woodford (2003) includes features in-
ducing strategic complementarity as one of the baseline elements of the baseline New Keynesian
model.
Under positive nominal interest (it > 0), specic and non-specic factor market implies mul-
tipliers similar in magnitude. (e.g., in Table (4) we can compare 0.61 and 0.67 for an increase in
spending or 0.40 and 0.44 for a cut in sales tax). Also, multipliers under specic factor market
are the slightly bigger than their economy-wide counterparts as those rms who employ specic
labor (and, thus, having strategic complementarity in pricing decisons) that have less opportunity
to change prices and thus, will increase their output a bit more in case of a positive scal shock.
However, the latter is not true anymore when the zero lower bound on nominal interest becomes
binding. The slope of the labor demand curve is inuenced by the value of . The lower  is
the steeper is the labor demand which, as shown by Eggertsson (2010a and 2010b), positively-
sloped in the i = 0 case. Consequently, labor demand with homogenous input is atter than with
heterogenous input. On the left panel Figure (1) we can track a rise in spending that shifts out
both LD and LS to the right (denoted by LDand LS) resulting in lower wage and higher hours
worked. Note that the shift in LD for heterogenous market (dashed line) is larger than the shift
in LD for homogenous labor market (dashed-dotted line): the di¤erence comes from the value of
 multiplying G^S in the labor demand curve. Further, under homogenous labor market the rise
in labor is bigger (point B2) than under heterogenous market (point B1)22 . On the right panel of
Figure (1) we observe a rightward shift in LS after a decrease in labor tax. It is only the LS that
21Woodford (2003) Chapter 3 gives an overview on the importance of the assumptions regarding the factor market
for the propagation of nominal income shocks.
22Note that a decrease in sales tax is analogous to a rise in spending. However, the sales tax cut has a smaller
e¤ect because it has a coe¢ cient, , in the AD curve in equation (1) that is smaller than one.
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moves as LD does not contain the wage tax. One can further say that these expansionary scal
policies have a deationary aspect in the sense that the fall in wages reduce marginal costs exerting
a downward pressure on prices (Eggertsson (2010a)). Also, Table (4) shows that spending (1.74),
labor tax cut (-0.32) and sales tax cut (1.14) multipliers for homogenous labor market are higher
than those for specic labor market (1.08, -0.03 and 0.71, respectively)23 . Also important to note
here that the labor tax multiplier under specic factor market is now close to zero24 .
For completeness, we have to add that the presence of DRS in production can itself imply
strategic complementary without assuming specic labor market as explained by Woodford (2003).
Therefore, it is fair to ask whether multipliers between economy-wide labor market with CRS and
the same with DRS di¤er as strikingly as they do for the economy wide versus specic markets.
The answer is that they still di¤er but the comparison can be made only for low persistence values
because in case of homogenous labor market and CRS  can take the maximum of 0:69 in order for
C2 to be satised. It remains to be true that the di¤erence is signicant for only su¢ ciently high
level of persistence (i.e. for  > 0:5).
In the next, we plot multipliers for both types of labor markets and nd that multipliers do
not di¤er sharply under i > 0 and i = 0 if the persistence of the scal shock is su¢ ciently but
not implausibly low. Woodford (2010) also argues that for low values of the persistence parameter
( < 0:903) the spending multiplier do not exceed one. Here, we make an even stronger claim. That
is, multipliers practically coincide if the deationary shock and the accompanying scal stance
last for three (six) years or shorter in case of economy-wide (specic) labor market. On Figure (2),
(3), (4) and (5) we can observe spending, labor tax cut, sales tax cut and capital tax cut multipliers,
respectively25 , for both types of labor markets. The upper panels refer to calculations under the
Taylor rule in equation (3). Figures on the lower panels corresponds to the same Taylor rule but
with no reaction to output-gap (i.e. 2 = 0 as assumed by Christiano et al. (2010) in their model
in section 2). We can see in the upper panels that multipliers are very similar in magnitude under
i > 0 and i = 0 for modest level of persistence (e.g.,  = 0:7 (0:8) implies a 3 13 (6) years shock). The
latter nding is even more spectacular in the lower panels when there is no reaction to output gap
in the Taylor rule. It is shown in Woodford (2010) that even for low value of reS , the shock can be
quite large and leading to huge deation and output collapse if the persistence parameter is big
23Unfortunately, multipliers derived under the assumption of homogenous and heterogenous factor markets are
not directly comparable when it = 0 as the estimated value of  = 0:903 which Eggertsson (2010) obtained using
specic labor market under homogenous factor markets no longer satises C2 as  di¤ers depending on type of the
factor market we assume. In case of homogenous factor market, g > 0 and DRS the maximal value of  that satises
the previous condition is 0.85. For  = 0:85 the multiplier is unplausibly large. Hence, we use the somewhat lower
but empirically still plausible value of  = 0:8 of Christiano et al. (2010) for comparison.
24Therefore we can easily generate a case for which the negative and large (in absolute value) labor tax multiplier
of Eggertsson (2010) is still negative but very close to zero.
25 In constructing the graphs we excluded values of  > 0:92 for which the multiplier is implausibly large (it is 16
for  = 0:93) so that we can avoid distortion of the graphs for values of  < 0:92 that convey multipliers between 1
and 2.
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(e.g. the estimated value of  = 0:903 by Eggertsson (2010a) implies 10 quarters mean duration of
the shock)26 . However, one can assume a shock that lasts for somewhat shorter time (e.g.  = 0:8
in Christiano et al. 2010). Then, in the latter case, multipliers for i = 0 are not signicantly
larger than those for i > 0. Hence, the multipliers of Eggertsson (2010a) for i = 0 are large under
relatively special circumstances (i.e. a su¢ ciently long period of shock with an expansionary scal
policy at the same time). The latter also reects the peculiar features of the two-state Markovian
structure used to model the zero nominal interest rate.
6.2 The e¤ect of positive government spending-output ratio and decreas-
ing returns
Let us further discuss the numbers in Table (4). We realise that multipliers in case of i > 0 do not
di¤er too much for constant returns (CRS) and decreasing returns (DRS) irrespectively whether
g is zero or positive. However, for i = 0 we can see that the government spending multiplier
with positive g > 0 and DRS is less (the wage tax cut multiplier is also smaller in absolute value)
than those obtained by Eggertsson (2010a) who assumed g = 0 and CRS. Why does the spending
multiplier increase in case of i > 0 if we allow for g > 0 (and DRS)? When g > 0 the value of
intertemporal elasticity of substitution falls (downscaled) this is apparent from the denition of
coe¢ cient  = (1   g) and people are less willing to substitute present consumption for future
consumption after the positive government spending shock even if the negative wealth e¤ect27 forces
consumers to do so. Thus, lower  results in smaller consumption loss and a higher multiplier.
In contrast when i = 0 multipliers diminish under positive long-run spending. When i = 0,
expansionary scal policy leads to a sharp rise in ination which due to the lack of Taylor rule
implies a fall in the real rate. The latter serves as an incentive for households to consume more
in the present and, thereby, increasing the multiplier. However, this incentive is less strong under
lower substitution ( < ) which is why g > 0 downsize the multiplier under i = 0.
Also introducing diminishing returns to technology implies that a unit of labor produces less
than one unit of output. That is, when monopolistically competitive rms increase their labor
demand due to the rise in demand for their products they can produce less under DRS than under
CRS. Hence, under DRS multipliers (for wage tax cut we mean in absolute value) are lower than
those for CRS irrespectively whether i > 0 or i = 0. The only exception is the wage tax cut that
delivers multipliers seemingly di¤erent in size under CRS and DRS when i = 0.
26We can conrm this claim by looking at the coe¢ cient on ret in equation (10) that is increasing in .
27As Ricardian evidence holds and government spending is nanced through present and future lump sum taxes
the consumer is willing to delay current consumption and work more hours.
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6.3 Some remarks on Christiano et al. (2010)
The assumption of homogenous labor market and constant returns in Christiano et al. (2010 section
2 and 3) constrain the value of Calvo parameter to a minimum of 0:82 through condition C2 in
equation (7). However, we argue that the generalisation of the model in Christiano et al. (2010) for
heterogenous factor market (instead of homogenous) conveys high multipliers even for low values of
the Calvo parameter. In particular, the lowest possible value is  = 0:61 which implying less than
three quarters of price stickiness results in a multiplier of around 58. If we allow for decreasing
returns (instead of constant returns) as well then  can be even smaller. For an empirically plausible
value of the Calvo parameter (e.g.  = 0:75 instead of  = 0:85)28 and using conguration for
the other parameters in Table (3)29 we found a spending multiplier of 1:60 under specic labor
market. Instead, using the full calibration in Table (3) the spending multiplier for heterogenous
labor market is only1:36 while for homogenous factor which is the one used by Christiano et
al. (2010) it is huge (3:7). Even if multipliers with separable and non-separable preferences are
not directly comparable we can observe that they are very similar in magnitude if we allow for the
same persistence, Calvo parameter and heterogenous labor market under i = 0.
The reason why multiplier can be very high even for low  lies in the value of 30 : for het-
erogenous labor market the value of  can be very small without a high . Ohanian (2010)
argues when discussing Eggertsson (2010a) that condition C2 is hard to satisfy if prices change
frequently (! 0). However, we can claim that condition C2 is less stringent if we allow for some
straightforward real friction like factor specicity (and/or features like DRS instead of CRS). For
non-separable preferences,  in condition C2 are inuenced by even more parameters as, now, the
labor supply elasticity which is ! for separable preferences corresponds to ratio, N=(1   N),
consisting steady-state hours which is a function of the weighting parameter, , the steady state
consumption tax, labor tax and the steady-state markup (=(   1)). Surprisingly, Christiano et
al. (2010) eliminated steady-state markup distortion by imposing a lump-sum employment subsidy.
However, we have no obvious reason to do alike. The consequence of eliminating the steady-state
distortion due to monopolistic competition is, interestingly, a fall in the multipliers. It is because
the presence of steady-state wage (the inverse of the markup), (   1)=, which multiplies ! and
makes denominator of multipliers larger. Hence, multipliers gets smaller (3:38 instead of 3:7 for
the baseline calibration with non-separable preferences). However, the rm-specic setup slightly
28 Including sales prices Nakamura and Steinsson (2008) found an average price stickiness of one year on average
( = 0:75). The same value is used by Christiano et al. (2011) in their middle-sized DSGE model in section 5.
However, some author assume shorter period of price stickiness: e.g. Edge (2002) assumes six months price inertia
while Bils and Klenow (2004) excluding sales prices estimated a mean duration of seven months.
29Christiano et al. (2010) uses a Taylor rule which allows for the possibility of accomodative monetary policy as
well (or, to put it di¤erently, interest rate smooting that is governed by coe¢ cient R). However, they calibrate R
to equal zero so the Taylor rule here in equation (3) remains valid. Otherwise, for R > 0; it is not possible to solve
for the multipliers analytically.
30Note that the value of  is inversely related to .
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boost multipliers because the non-zero markup raises  which reduces the denominator by more
than the amount it reduces the nominator in the formulas of multipliers (for proof see Technical
Appendix). Thus, e.g. for  = 0:67 the spending multiplier with non-zero markup is 2:56 instead
of 2:43 with zero markup. Also, for smaller , the di¤erence between the size of multipliers with
zero and non-zero markup is even more pronounced.
7 Conclusion
This paper showed that the baseline New Keynesian model employed by Eggertsson (2010a) delivers
large multipliers in case of zero nominal interest only if the deationary shock that makes the
zero bound binding on the nominal interest and the accompanying transitory scal measure is
very persistent. In particular, multipliers are large when the scal shock lasts for at least ten (six)
years in case of specic (economy-wide) labor market. When the zero bound is not binding a Taylor
rule is operative which implies multipliers that is slightly lower than one as shown, for example, by
Woodford (2010). We also demonstrated that even straightforward extensions of Eggertsson (2010a)
like positive government spending (instead of zero) in steady-state and decreasing returns (instead
of constant returns) in technology sizeably decrease the size of government spending multiplier when
nominal interest is zero. Christiano (2010) expressed his concern about the quantitative relevance
of the labor tax hike multiplier of Eggertsson (2010a). Here, we also demonstrated that even small
departures from the assumptions of Eggertsson (2010a) can cast doubt on the quantitative nature
of the other multipliers like spending increase or sales tax cut as well. Based on our calculations
we are skeptic about relevance of the policy conclusions of Eggertsson (2010a) and Christiano et al.
(2010).
8 Appendix
Proof. Following Eggertsson (2010a) let us employ the labor market equilibrium. Combining the
loglinear Euler, NKPC and market clearing equations we obtain the inverse labor demand curve:
W^S = 
 1N^S   (1  ) 1reS    1G^S + S ^SS   A(1  ) 1^AS (11)
where   1 (1 ) . Similarly, let us substitute the loglinear market clearing for consumption into
the loglinear intratemporal condition to arrive at the inverse labor supply:
W^S =

!+  1


N^S + 
W ^WS + 
S ^SS    1G^S . (12)
16
The value of  does not inuence labor supply. However, it enters labor demand through . First,
we show that the value of  in case of homogenous labor market (denoted as hom) is higher than
the  under heterogenous labor market (het):
het < hom: (13)
Using the denition of het and hom we can write:
het  (1  )(1  )

! + #+ (  1)
1 + !y
; hom  (1  )(1  )

! + #+ (  1)
1 + (  1) ;
where the di¤erence between het and hom lies in their denominator. Further, we observe that
!y  (1 + !)  1 > (  1)
is always true as ! > 0. Then, it follows that inequality (13) holds and the slope of the labor
demand under heterogenous factor market is higher than the one under homogenous labor market 
@W^S
@N^S
!
hom
<
 
@W^S
@N^S
!
het
as
hom < het:
A demand shock that shifts labor demand (and also labor supply), is less e¤ective if the labor
demand is steep. As shown above the specic labor market assumption delivers a labor demand
which is steeper than its economy-wide counterpart.
In the next we argue that the rightward shift in labor demand under specic labor market is larger
than the same under economy-wide one. To do so, it is necessary to realise that a scal shock (a
rise in spending or a cut in sales tax) that directly a¤ects demand (i.e. it enters the demand)
shift out labor demand more under specic and less under economy-wide labour market structure
by studying the coe¢ cients on government spending (or sales tax) in the labor demand (LD) and
supply (LS) equations (11) and (12) we nd:
( 1)LS < ( 1)LD hom < ( 1)LD het:
The latter inequality shows that it is the labor supply (LS) which moves the least and labor
demand with heterogenous factor market (LD   het) which moves the most to the right on gure
(1) with the shift in labor demand under homogenous factor market (LD   hom) in between after
an expansionary scal shock. Thus, the rise in labor demand due to a scal stimulus leads to higher
17
output produced under economy-wide labour market with a correspondingly higher multiplier than
the one of specic factor market.
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Table 4: Summary of Multipliers Separable Preferences
Multipliers Constant Returns (CRS) Decreasing Returns (DRS)
it > 0 it = 0 it > 0 it = 0
Gov. spending, d
bYt
d bGt ; g = 0 0.46 2.28 0.44 1.94
Gov. spending, d
bYt
d bGt ; g > 0 0.5208 1.81 0.5 1.63
[0.61j0.67] [1.74j1.08]
Payroll tax cut, d
bYt
 dbWt 0.0815 -1.02 0.04 -0.41
[0.07j0.04] [-0.32j-0.03]
Sales tax cut, d
bYt
 dbSt 0.38 1.87 0.37 1.6
[0.40j0.44] [1.14j0.71]
Capital tax cut, d
bYt
 dbAt -0.0104 -0.10 -0.01 -0.06
Remarks to Table 4: Gray cells indicate the extensions by this paper.
White cells contain the values calculated by Eggertsson (2010a). g is the steady-state
government speding-GDP ratio, i is the nominal interest rate. Un-bracketed values are
derived under the assumption of heterogenous labor market. Values # and \ in brackets,
[#j\], stand for homogenous (#) and heterogenous (\) labor market with a persistence
parameter  = :8 chosen so that multipliers in i = 0 case exist under both types of labor
market. Comparison not reported for capital tax as no striking di¤erence. Also omitted
for CRS and for g = 0 where determinacy for i = 0 is limited to relatively low values of 
that may not be empirically relevant.
Figure 1: Left panel: an increase in government spending. Right panel: a decrease in labor tax.
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Figure 2: Government Spending Multipliers
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Figure 3: Wage tax cut multiplier
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Figure 4: Sales tax cut multipliers
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Figure 5: Capital tax cut multiplier
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